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In a recent study, we found a negative association between psychopathy and violence
against genetic relatives. We interpreted this result as a form of nepotism and argued
that it failed to support the hypothesis that psychopathy is a mental disorder, suggesting
instead that it supports the hypothesis that psychopathy is an evolved life history strategy.
This interpretation and subsequent arguments have been challenged in a number of
ways. Here, we identify several misunderstandings regarding the harmful dysfunction
definition of mental disorder as it applies to psychopathy and regarding the meaning of
nepotism. Furthermore, we examine the evidence provided by our critics that psychopathy
is associated with other disorders, and we offer a comment on their alternative model
of psychopathy. We conclude that there remains little evidence that psychopathy is the
product of dysfunctional mechanisms.
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Psychopathy poses a significant problem to communal living:
psychopaths are far more likely than others to engage in harm-
ful behaviors ranging from the parasitic to the homicidal. In this
light, we thank Leedom and Hartoonian Almas (2012) for their
comments on Krupp et al. (2012), as they provide us with an
opportunity to clarify the arguments we made and to continue
working toward a sophisticated and testable evolution-minded
model of psychopathy that may help to address this problem.
Following Wakefield’s (1992) influential concept of harm-
ful dysfunction, Krupp et al. (2012; see also Harris et al.,
2001a,b) argued that psychopathy may be considered a men-
tal disorder only if there is compelling evidence that it (1)
leads to harm to self or others and (2) is caused by a fail-
ure of psychological mechanisms to serve the functions for
which they were designed by natural selection. In keeping with
the first criterion, we accept without qualification that psy-
chopathy causes disproportionate harm to others. What we
challenge is the claim that there is evidence, compelling or
otherwise, of the second criterion—that psychopathy is the
result of dysfunctional psychological mechanisms in the sense
implied above.
We take it as given that the brains of psychopaths differ from
those of nonpsychopaths in systematic ways. Without such dif-
ferences, psychopaths could not be reliably set apart in their
cognition and behavior from nonpsychopaths. But difference is
not isomorphic with dysfunction. For instance, although the
brains of men and women have much in common, they must
also be different on average, as must the brains of young and old,
married and single, androphile and gynephile, Anglophone and
Francophone, and so on, even if these brain differences are solely
the result of differences of experience. While the life sciences
have begun to recognize that such differences do not inherently
reflect disorder, the relationship between difference and disorder
nevertheless continues to bedevil the study of mental health.
An argument for dysfunction must marshal supporting evi-
dence, and this must be distinguishable from evidence of dif-
ference. For example, researchers should not assume without
corroboration that a burglar was mentally disordered simply
because he committed theft, any more than they should assume
that a child was mentally disordered for failing to share her
toys with her siblings. Chronic malefaction, however, is often
construed—groundlessly, we hasten to add—as proof of disorder.
And so, while researchers enthusiastically catalogue the neural
and cognitive particulars of inveterate misbehavior, their efforts
do not necessarily provide evidence of the failure of mechanisms
to perform their selected functions.
There are many signs that mental mechanisms are not per-
forming in accordance with their adaptive design, including
injuries to the brain, obstetrical complications, excessive levels
of fluctuating asymmetry, and other indications of neurode-
velopmental perturbation. As discussed in our article and the
references cited therein, there is no evidence that any of these
indicators covary positively with psychopathy. Other signs of
mental dysfunction might include behaviors that would have led
to ineluctable inclusive fitness costs in ancestral environments.
An individual’s inclusive fitness is the net effect of its genotype
on its own fitness (d, for direct fitness), including effects on lin-
eal descendants, and on the fitness of others bearing nonrandom
genotypes (i, for indirect fitness), including effects on collateral
kin (Hamilton, 1964, 1970). Upregulating, downregulating, or
taking adaptations entirely “offline” may have led to inclusive
fitness decrements or increments, depending upon the condi-
tions under which these adaptations would have been expected to
operate. For instance, worker sterility has independently evolved
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numerous times among the eusocial Hymenoptera and other
eusocial taxa (e.g., aphids, termites, and thrips). What might
appear at first blush to be an unmitigated failure of design—the
reproductive function of scores of individuals has been downreg-
ulated or taken offline, in many cases permanently—is anything
but: eusociality has evolved only under conditions of high genetic
relatedness between reproductives and workers, in keeping with
the hypothesis that workers benefit their inclusive fitness more
from rearing their full siblings together than from rearing their
own offspring alone (Hughes et al., 2008). Hence, even gross vari-
ation in behavioral or physical phenotype may be due either to
developmental error and injury or to adaptive design, in much
the same way that the polymorphisms of the army ant Eciton
burchellii (Franks, 1985, 1986) or male bluegill sunfish (Lepomis
macrocheris; Gross and Charnov, 1980; Gross, 1991) reflect adap-
tive specialization to different strategic interests.
The task at hand, then, is to discover whether differences in
mental functioning historically entailed inclusive fitness costs and
to furthermore identify their sources. For example, failing mem-
ory systems cause profound deficits in the ability to navigate
one’s physical and social universe, as evidenced by individuals
with anterograde amnesia (Scoville and Milner, 1957), dementia
(Bowen et al., 1997), and schizophrenia (Frith and Done, 1989;
Nathaniel-James and Frith, 1996; Corcoran and Frith, 2003).
These memory failures seem neither to provide any fitness advan-
tage nor to be compensated for by modified or alternative mecha-
nisms, and so would have caused a decrease in the inclusive fitness
of those afflicted with them. Concomitant with these failures are
indicators of pathology and disturbance, including brain damage
(Scoville and Milner, 1957), minor physical anomalies (Weinberg
et al., 2007), pre- and perinatal complications (Cannon et al.,
2002), excess fluctuating asymmetry (Markow, 1992), and oxida-
tive stress (Bennett et al., 2009; Bitanihirwe and Woo, 2011), as
would be expected were they symptomatic of a mental disorder.
The inclusive fitness effect is the maximand of selection
(Grafen, 2006), and the corresponding condition for which an
action is favored by selection is given by d + i > 0. Using this
formulation, it becomes plain that individuals pursuing a psy-
chopathic “strategy” as we and others have envisioned it—one of
persistent social exploitation—must, on balance, behave in ways
that historically maximized benefits and minimized costs to d, i,
or both. Thus, for a start, they cannot impose costs on their
lineal descendants and on collateral kin that, after weighting by
relatedness, are disproportionate to the benefits of their actions.
Psychopathy seems to be associated with an upregulation of sex-
ual psychology and associated behaviors (Quinsey et al., 1995;
Lalumière and Quinsey, 1996; Harris et al., 2007b), and this is
mirrored by evidence that psychopathic offenders have at least
as many offspring as nonpsychopathic controls and may even
have slightly more (Harris et al., 2007b; Pulkkinen et al., 2009;
Vachon et al., 2012; cf. Power et al., 2013). We do not know with
any certainty what fecundity advantage psychopaths would have
enjoyed in ancestral environments, but its effects on inclusive fit-
ness would have been undercut by any imposition of significant
costs to offspring and other genealogical kin.
Following the logic outlined above, the arguments for dys-
function and for adaptation generate rival hypotheses. If, on
the one hand, psychopathy is a mental disorder sensu Wakefield
(1992), then we would hypothesize that psychopathic offend-
ers, relative to their nonpsychopathic counterparts, ought not
to behave nepotistically, because their psychology has been pro-
foundly affected by a maladaptive course of development. After
all, it would be peculiar for misdirected ontogenetic processes to
leave nepotistic devices alone when they have had such sweep-
ing, downregulatory effects on related systems, such as empathy,
remorse, and guilt (Hare, 1993). Indeed, as discussed in Krupp
et al. (2012), perpetrators who behave violently toward kin carry
an elevated risk of mental disorder diagnosis (Daly and Wilson,
1988a; Harris et al., 2007a). If, on the other hand, psychopa-
thy represents an alternative life strategy of persistent social
exploitation, then we would hypothesize that psychopaths ought
to behave nepotistically in that they limit the costs they impose
on genetic relatives. Thus, nepotistic discrimination can be used
as an indicator of mental disorder.
In our study, we failed to support the former hypothesis and,
consequently, supported the latter: scores on the Psychopathy
Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991), an archetypal measure of
psychopathy, were significantly negatively associated with victim-
offender relatedness in the index offenses of violent offenders.
This finding, which implies that psychopathy is associated with
benefits rather than costs to inclusive fitness (because harm
was likely allocated to negative relatives), was not explained by
measures of distance or frequency of dispersal, and it was not
explained by a measure of inbreeding avoidance, though it must
of course be explained by something. When the sample was
restricted to offenders who did not coreside with kin, the direc-
tion of the association remained unchanged, though it was no
longer statistically significant, continuing to imply that psychopa-
thy was not associated with any cost to an individual’s inclusive
fitness. All of this suggests that, in the context of violence, psy-
chopathic offenders behaved at least as nepotistically, and possibly
more so, than did their nonpsychopathic counterparts.
Broadly, Leedom and Hartoonian Almas (2012) criticize
Krupp et al. (2012) from two positions. Their first point of dis-
agreement regards evidence of nepotism among psychopathic
individuals. While they do not dispute our findings, they argue
that these findings do not constitute evidence of nepotism for
three reasons: (1) psychopaths may nevertheless harm genealog-
ical relatives in ways not measured by our study; (2) a majority
of psychopathic offenders are nonviolent, and so our use of vio-
lence as a measure of harm is inappropriate; and (3) a reduction
in harm to relatives is not the same as nepotistic help.
We acknowledged (1) when we wrote: “[i]t is possible, for
instance, that the cumulative effects of psychopathy on an
offender’s kin, including negative reputational effects, are sub-
stantial, even though the costs of individual actions may be small”
(Krupp et al., 2012, p. 5). Researchers are limited to the data
they have in hand, however, and (as discussed by Leedom and
Hartoonian Almas, 2012) no other study of sufficient quality
exists that speaks to this problem. Regarding (2), violence would
undoubtedly have had large effects on fitness relative to most
other forms of social interaction, and so is relevant even when
rare. Moreover, Leedom and Hartoonian Almas provide no evi-
dence that “most psychopathic individuals are not violent” (p. 1).
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The PCL-R is a formidable individual-level predictor of violence
in many forms (reviewed in Harris et al., 2001b); if we cannot
apply to psychopathic individuals data measuring violent behav-
ior, to whom can such data be applied? Finally, and furthermore
with respect to (1), studies of violence may provide unique psy-
chological insights, because violence is rarely caused by anything
short of powerful concerns and because reports of violence are
bound to be considerably less biased than reports of other sorts
of behavior (Daly and Wilson, 1988a,b). To deny the importance
of violence because it is rare is to deny all that studies of violence
have contributed to our understanding of parental and familial
love (e.g., Wilson et al., 1980; Daly and Wilson, 1982, 1988a,b;
Harris et al., 2007a), sexual proprietariness (e.g., Daly et al., 1982;
Daly and Wilson, 1988a,b; Wilson and Daly, 1992, 1993), and
intrasexual competition (e.g., Wilson and Daly, 1985, 1997; Daly
and Wilson, 1988a,b, 2010).
We are puzzled by (3), given that Leedom and Hartoonian
Almas (2012) quote fully the following statement from Krupp
et al. (2012, p. 2, emphasis added): “individuals executing well-
designed strategies, a necessary feature of psychological adap-
tations, should tend to be nepotistic—providing aid to close
genealogical kin and/or sparing them from harm.” As discussed
here and in the original article, nepotistic systems are not required
to help genealogical relatives; rather, they are required to discrim-
inate between positive and negative relatives in such a way as to
maximize the actor’s inclusive fitness, which may entail helping
kin when cooperation is favored or minimizing the costs to kin
and instead imposing them on others when it is not. Simply put,
a lack of violent harm need not be synonymous with help for it to
qualify as an adaptive form of nepotism. Psychopathic individuals
may not make for nice genetic relations, but they appear to make
for worse nongenetic relations still.
Leedom and Hartoonian Almas’s (2012) second point of
disagreement concerns the way in which our study speaks to
Wakefield’s (1992) concept of mental disorder which, if the reader
will recall, is defined as a psychological phenomenon that (1)
causes harm to self or others and (2) is the result of a failure of
one or more psychological mechanisms to perform the tasks for
which they were designed. Curiously, Leedom and Hartoonian
Almas focus only on the first criterion, stating that “Any ‘benefit’
of psychopathy according to Krupp et al. (2012) is in perpet-
uation of genes only. However, that psychopathic individuals
might contribute to the gene pool, has no bearing on the defi-
nition of harm as conceptualized by Wakefield” (p. 1, emphasis
added). This is true insofar as criterion (1) is concerned, but
our analysis was concerned with criterion (2)—that the design of
nepotistic psychology remains intact among psychopaths, provid-
ing further evidence in support of extant adaptation hypotheses
and against mental disorder hypotheses. Leedom and Hartoonian
Almas appear to have understood that all parties are in agreement
on criterion (1), as they state “That psychopathy is associated
with disastrous consequences for individuals and society was
not disputed by the authors” (p. 1). Yet, they seem to have
entirely overlooked the relevance of our study to criterion (2):
the only measure of cost and benefit that matters with respect to
Wakefield’s (1992) dysfunction criterion is that which concerns
the effect of an action on inclusive fitness.
Relatedly, Leedom andHartoonian Almas (2012) disagree with
our statement that “psychopathy is neither comorbid nor associ-
ated with the neurodevelopmental perturbations characteristic of
other serious mental illnesses, such as psychosis and mental retar-
dation” (Krupp et al., 2012, p. 1), arguing that psychopathy is
associated with paranoid personality disorder (citing Blackburn
and Maybury, 1985; Blackburn, 1998; Fullam and Dolan, 2006;
McGregor et al., 2012) and Eysenck’s concept of psychoticism
(citing Eysenck and Eysenck, 1977; Corr, 2010); they further
point to a study by Suchankova et al. (2012) showing that psy-
choticism is associated with schizophrenia. While we covered the
issue of neurodevelopmental perturbations in Krupp et al. (2012)
and elsewhere (Harris et al., 2001a; Lalumière et al., 2001), we
must further examine the evidence that Leedom and Hartoonian
Almas provide suggesting that psychopathy is comorbid with true
mental illness. Unfortunately, we find this evidence wanting.
First, while psychopathy is comorbid with some person-
ality disorders (e.g., antisocial personality disorder), none of
them—paranoid personality disorder included—reflect psy-
chosis. Moreover, it remains to be established whether any per-
sonality disorder may be characterized as a disorder in the sense
meant by Wakefield (1992). Second, it is clear that Eysenck’s con-
cept of psychoticism is unusual, as it reflects tough-minded, anti-
social, unempathic, egocentric, impulsive, and aggressive traits
(Eysenck, 1992). These characteristics resemble psychopathy far
more than they do psychosis. Third, neither Blackburn and
Maybury (1985) nor Corr (2010) presented any data demonstrat-
ing that psychopathy and psychosis (as it is commonly under-
stood) are comorbid; rather, they relied on associations between
measures of psychopathy and Eysenck’s psychoticism. All of this is
tantamount to idiosyncratically defining psychosis as manifesting
manipulation, callousness, lying, remorselessness, glibness, shal-
low affect, proneness to boredom, irresponsibility, impulsivity,
poor behavior controls, criminal versatility (and so on), and then
“discovering” that it is comorbid with psychopathy as assessed by
the PCL-R. Fourth, Fullam and Dolan (2006) andMcGregor et al.
(2012) only studied patients with schizophrenia or schizophre-
nia spectrum conditions, reporting that PCL-R scores predicted
violence in such samples; the title of Fullam and Dolan’s article
notwithstanding, this sort of work does not—indeed, cannot—
bear on the question of whether psychopathy and schizophrenia
are comorbid (i.e., associated with each other in the popula-
tion). Finally, Suchankova et al. (2012) provided evidence of a
link between schizophrenia and an amalgam of scores on the
detachment and suspicion subscales of the Karolinska Scales of
Personality, but it is not remotely clear how such a relationship
speaks to the question of whether psychopathy and psychosis
(as conventionally understood) are related.
Leedom and Hartoonian Almas (2012) argue that, “[r]ather
than being ‘an adaptation’ psychopathy may represent a
spandrel—a syndrome that arises as a consequence of other
features” (p. 2). They then go on to sketch their own evolution-
minded model of psychopathy as, if we understand it correctly,
the upshot of selection on dominance systems. We cannot ade-
quately address here whether this model better accounts for
the unique features of psychopathy than do others. We can,
however, point out that identifying psychopathy as a “spandrel”
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(Gould and Lewontin, 1979; see also Buss et al., 1998; Andrews
et al., 2002) does not speak to the argument for dysfunction.
A spandrel has no evolved function, and so cannot itself be
dysfunctional. Hence, the mechanisms from which a spandrel
manifests would themselves have to be dysfunctional to support
an argument for dysfunction. In turn, the evidence for this would
have to resemble that which has been outlined above: indications
of neurodevelopmental perturbation and dysregulation of sys-
tems resulting in historical inclusive fitness costs. We arrive, then,
back where we began: there is no evidence that psychopathy is the
result of dysfunctional rather than merely different psychological
mechanisms.
The disagreement between adaptation and disorder mod-
els of psychopathy does not rest solely on semantics. To the
degree that one class of model better accounts for the psychol-
ogy of psychopathy, it will also better help us to understand and,
hopefully, to cope with psychopathy. If psychopathy is a mental
disorder, the absence of indicators of developmental instability
or intellectual, operational, or reproductive disadvantage strikes
us as odd. Equally surprising, important aspects of nepotistic
design appear to remain intact even when related emotional cir-
cuitry has been profoundly revised. Until such time as compelling
evidence of dysfunction (rather than difference) is presented, it
is imperative that we continue to develop and test alternative,
functional hypotheses of psychopathy such as the frequency-
dependent model posited by Harpending and Sobus (1987),
Mealey (1995), Harris et al. (2001b), Lalumière et al. (2001), and
others.
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